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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the current state of theoretical and 
empirical knowledge regarding compliance with the federal income tax 
laws. We focus on the validity of certain myths that have come to 
dominate tax compliance discussions. Toward that end, we discuss three 
general categories -- empirical work, theoretical methodology and 
fiscal policy recommendations -- that seem to require more careful 
assessment and formulation. 
THE ECONOMICS OF TAX COMPLIANCE: FACT AND FANTASY 
Michael J, Graetz and Louis L. Wilde 
Robin: On Tuesday, I made a false income tax return. 
All: Ha! Ha! 
1st Ghost: That's nothing. 
2nd Ghost: Nothing at all. 
3rd Ghost: Everybody does that. 
4th Ghost: It's expected of you. 
W. S, Gilbert, Ruddigore, Act ii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Announcements by both the Internal Revenue Service and private 
analysts that in recent years unreported taxable income in the United 
States has been averaging 10-15 percent of total taxable income! and 
that noncompliance seems to be growing rapidly2 have produced a certain 
sense of panic among commentators in academia, the private bar, 
government and the news media. One commentator went so far as to say: 
"the dramatic deterioration in compliance levels witnessed thus far, if 
not reversed quickly and forcefully, will gain further momentum and 
eventually erode, beyond repair, the integrity of our present income 
tax system.113 
A National Academy of Science Panel on Tax Compliance has been 
established; the American Bar Foundation has begun a massive research 
effort; and the Internal Revenue Service has held a series of 
conferences of academic experts from a wide variety of disciplines in 
an effort better to understand the causes of noncompliance and to 
develop new tools to combat it. 
2 
Beginning in 1981 and again in 1982 and 1984 Congress provided 
the IRS with new weapons to be used in its battle against taxpayer 
noncompliance. They include increased and new penalties for 
substantial understatements of tax liabilities ({6661), for aiding and 
abetting understatements of tax liabilities ({6701), for the filing of 
frivolous returns ({6702), for failure to supply taxpayer 
identification numbers ({6676(a)), for failure to file information 
returns ({{6652, 6678, 6686), for extended failure to file tax returns 
({6651) and for the promotion of abusive tax shelters ({6700). In 
addition, criminal fines were increased ({{7201, 7203, 7205, 7206, 
7207) and additional information reporting was required ({{6049, 6041A, 
6678, 6050E, 6053(c), 6706, 6708). New requirements for registering 
tax shelters with the IRS and for maintaining lists of tax shelter 
investors were enacted ({{6111, 6112, 6707, 6708) and the IRS was given 
authority to seek injunctions against the promoters of "abusive tax 
shelters" ( {7408). Indeed, the compliance measures enacted in 1982 
were estimated to raise one-third of the total revenues estimated to be 
raised by the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
Although recent analyses of the tax compliance problem have 
involved experts from a variety of disciplines in addition to economics 
-- notably law, sociology and psychology -- economic analyses of the 
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noncompliance problem have tended to dominate the research and policy 
agenda, Not only were the 1981 and 1982 legislative enactments 
consistent with the basic posture of the economics literature, but the 
1982 committee reports seem also explicitly to embrace the economic 
model, describing the tax collection process as a "tax or audit 
lottery" where citizens are assumed to endeavor to optimize outcomes, 
Moreover, noncompliance estimates and concerns seem to have motivated 
(and certainly are used by) economists to justify a variety of fiscal 
policy recommendations. For example, one of the reasons now routinely 
advanced for moving to a lower-rate broad-based income tax or even for 
abandoning an income base in favor of a consumption-based tax is the 
alleged advantages of these regimes in terms of compliance. While we 
certainly have no intention of inhibiting the tax compliance cottage 
industry (of which we clearly are a part), this NTA-TIA Conference 
seems an appropriate occasion for pausing to reflect upon the validity 
of certain myths that have come to dominate tax compliance discussions. 
Toward that end, we have selected three general categories -- empirical 
work, theoretical methodology and fiscal policy recommendations -- that 
seem to require more careful assessment and formulation, 
II. MYTH #1, EMPIRICAL DATA: WE KNOW HOW MUCH NONCOMPLIANCE 
THERE IS :AND HAVE A CLEAR SENSE OF ITS CAUSES 
Estimating the extent and nature of noncompliance with the tax 
laws is of course a difficult task, but it is one that tends to be done 
regardless of the shortcomings of the results. Policymakers, notably 
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the Congress, insist upon knowing the effect of tax law revisions on 
total federal revenues and thus estimates are put forth as if they were 
readily ascertainable facts, Likewise, and for obvious reasons, 
Commissioners of Internal Revenue routinely inform Congress and the 
public in nominally precise terms about the size, composition and 
growth rate of the tax compliance gap. Attempts by academic economists 
to estimate aggregate noncompliance using macroeconomic data date to 
the late fifties and early sixties. More recently empirical techniques 
have been applied to microeconomic data in an effort to delineate the 
causes of the problem as well as its size. Despite the relatively long 
history of these efforts, it is not unfair to say that empirical 
uncertainties still abound. James S, Henry, who has conducted the most 
comprehensive survey to date of research on federal income tax 
noncompliance, has cast serious doubt on the methodological soundness 
of all of the half-dozen or so empirical studies of aggregate 
noncompliance contained in the literature.4 
Estimating noncompliance in both the legal and illegal sectors 
of the economy is fraught with difficulties. Illegal sector estimates 
are obviously suspect. Recent estimates with respect to the legal 
sector (and empirical studies of them) almost invariably involve 
extrapolations from the IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program 
( "TCMP"). This Program involves intensive line-by-line audits of a 
randomly selected group of taxpayers and the tax understatements that 
it detects are then extrapolated to the broader universe of taxpayers 
generally. This is not an occasion for evaluating that program in 
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detail, but it deserves emphasis that measuring aggregate noncompliance 
is but a secondary use of TCMP, That program is principally designed 
to establish and refine IRS audit selection mechanisms, a task for 
which it is well-suited. This is because TCMP provides direct evidence 
of how much tax understatement can be detected by careful audits; it is 
an excellent mechanism for assessing audit effectiveness, for guiding 
the allocation of scarce IRS audit resources and for predicting how 
many dollars of additional tax revenues might be produced from 
additional dollars spent on tax audits. Coincidentally, it produces the 
best available data for estimating noncompliance, certainly better than 
is likely to emerge from surveys. But extrapolations from TCMP data to 
estimate aggregate noncompliance are necessarily subject to the 
inherent limitations of TCMP. To the extent that taxpayers selected 
for TCMP audits are able to conceal, for example, unreported cash 
income from the TCMP auditor, extrapolated estimates of noncompliance 
will be understated, That TCMP has generally missed nonf ilers 
altogether further restricts its validity as a mechanism for estimating 
noncompliance, 
Likewise, to the extent that empirical studies of the causes of 
noncompliance are grounded in TCMP data and other results of IRS audits 
and penalty assessments, they are subject to the same inherent 
limitations. A particular problem which arises in this regard is the 
treatment of variables related to IRS activity such as audit rates, 
penalty rates and the level of sanctions. Charles Clotfelter, who 
examined 1969 TCMP data, 5 acknowledges that these must influence 
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taxpayer reporting behavior, but leaves them out of his analysis 
because of what is termed "the simultaneity bias." The problem is the 
following: levels of noncompliance depend on a number of factors, 
including, for example, the likelihood of audit. At the same time, the 
likelihood of audit depends on the level of noncompliance, Thus it is 
inappropriate to use the likelihood of audit as an exogenous variable 
in an equation meant to explain the causes of noncompliance, As an 
empirical matter this problem can be overcome by including an equation 
which explains the probability of audit as a function of levels of 
noncompliance and other factors such as IRS resources, This, however, 
has not yet been done.6 
That tax noncompliance is a serious problem can be conceded to 
have been established -- if one puts any faith in the existing studies, 
10 to 15 percent of total taxable income seems a conservative estimate 
but this by itself is of limited usefulness. We in fact know far 
lees about the components and the rate of growth of the compliance gap 
than the current estimates would have us believe. 
III. MYTH #2, THEORETICAL METHODOLOGY: TAX NONCOMPLIANCE IS AN 
EXCELLENT OCCASION FOR RATHER STRAIGHTFORWARD APPLICATION OF
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME MODEL.
The basic economics of crime methodology was established more 
than fifteen years ago by Gary S. Becker] and has frequently been 
applied to tax evasion and avoidance, 8 Generally, this approach treats 
criminal activity as a rational individual decision based upon 
probabilities of detection and conviction and levels of punishment. 
The bulk of the theoretical economic literature on tax compliance 
consists of extensions and refinements of Becker's general model, 
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Although these extensions seem natural tax evasion, after all, is an 
economic crime -- most of the theoretical work to date is not 
particularly useful either for policy analysis or empirical study. 
Generally speaking, the problem is that the models are too simple, They 
consider only the actions of taxpayers and ignore the variety of other 
agents involved in the revenue collection process -- in particular, 
they fail to take into account the interrelationships between flexible 
IRS policy instruments and noncompliance behavior, 9 Moreover, they 
ignore important institutional, legal and political constraints that 
inhibit the ability of policymakers to apply what otherwise appear to 
be theoretically desirable remedies. 
At the broadest level, the failure is one which occurs 
generally in the literature applying economic analysis to law: the 
failure to analyze legal issues within a context that takes as given 
"answers to non-economic questions about political legitimacy and 
authority, about the rights of individuals and the power of the state, 
about the political, moral and legal constraints on the exercise of 
rights and powers.1110 In the context of tax compliance research this 
general problem becomes manifest in at least three important ways. 
First, there is extraordinary confusion about the relevant 
definition of noncompliance. The Internal Revenue Service (and it 
seems the Congress, the National Academy of Sciences Panel and the 
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American Bar Foundation Project) regards the appropriate measure of 
noncompliance to be "all the federal income taxes that are owed but not 
paid,1111 This then is what the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has in
mind when he reports an "income tax gap" of more than $100 billion.12
But this estimate must be disaggregated at least into three major 
components: (1) tax evasion with respect to sources of income from 
illegal activities, such as drugs and gambling; (2) tax evasion from 
otherwise legal activities, such as unreported cash income of self­
employed persons; and (3) tax understatements from taking advantage of 
factual and legal uncertainties about the application of the 
substantive tax law, for example, as in the tax shelter context. 
Legal, moral and political constraints operate quite 
differently for each of these three categories. For example, as with 
criminal law generally, application of criminal sanctions for tax 
understatements requires proof of moral culpability, satisfaction 
through due processes of law that the "criminal" deserves punishment. 
Thus, the law provides that criminal tax evasion requires proof of a 
particular state of mind of the noncomplying taxpayer, namely, of a 
willful understatement of tax liability. Proving that a tax 
understatement was characterized by the requisite knowledge and 
deliberate behavior is an extremely difficult matter and, in practice, 
renders the criminal sanction ineffective for all but a very few 
cases.13 Thus, tax evasion becomes something of a special case, The 
tax law -- in sharp contrast to the criminal law generally -- is 
characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. In the extreme case, the 
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so-called abusive tax shelters, for example, transactions that have 
little or no chance of being 'upheld by a court are routinely structured 
so that there is virtually zero probability that criminal sanctions 
will apply to the tax shelter investors whose taxes have been 
understated. 
In fact, attorneys and accountants routinely have provided 
"fraud insurance" in the form of tax opinions that assert there to be a 
"reasonable basis" that the taxpayer's position would be upheld. 
Application of even a relatively small "negligence" penalty thus 
becomes extremely unlikely; all that the aggressive taxpayer in such 
cases typically risks is the possibility that the tax avoided will have 
to be repaid, plus interest, or beginning in 1981 and 1982, perhaps, 
special penalties for overvaluation or substantial understatement of 
tax. Application of the standard economic theory of crime to tax 
avoidance cases of this type, where fraud penalties are easily avoided, 
produces an unambiguous prediction of behavior: throughout the 1970s 
no one should have paid the taxes they owed in these situations. 
The most rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of a decision 
whether or not to underreport taxable income reveals the following 
characteristic: if the sanction structure is to have any deterrent 
effect, a probability of punishment of less than 100 percent requires 
that the sanction must be greater than the amount of the cheater's 
benefit. During the past decade, while budget and political 
constraints meant that aggregate audit probabilities were typically 
closer to 2 percent than 100 percent, interest rates on understated tax 
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liabilities were often less than market rates. Even if one 
disaggregates audit probabilities by class of taxpayer, the sanction 
and detection structure still appears to be so lenient toward 
underreporting that the high compliance rate can only be explained 
either by taxpayers' (and third-party reporters) commitment to the 
responsibilities of citizenship and respect for the law or lack of 
opportunity for tax evasion. The 1981 and 1982 legislation has begun 
to reverse this imbalance, but the income tax can still be viewed as a 
game that for many classes of taxpayers favors significantly those who 
underreport. That an economic model analyzing the expected utility 
calculation of a would-be tax evader recommends large increases in the 
applicable sanction in light of the very low probability of its 
application quickly becomes irrelevant as a policy matter. In this 
country, at least, legal, moral and political constraints make this 
necessarily so. Coherence in our criminal law generally demands that 
"punishment fit the crime"; regardless of any alledged potential 
theoretical advantages, life imprisonment is simply not within the 
feasible set of punishments for tax evasion. Moreover, no criminal 
sanction (nor even a substantial civil "fraud" penalty) can be imposed 
absent satisfactory proof that the tax understatement was willful. 
The compliance problem will not be solved without taking into 
account these kinds of structural limitations on both detection and 
punishment. Neither the level of punishment nor of audits can 
realistically be greatly expanded. Moral, legal and political 
constraints therefore seem to require more narrowly targeted responses 
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to noncompliance, The new requirements for information reports, 
increased penalties for failure to file such reports and penalties for 
valuation overstatements enacted in 1981 and 1982 provide illustrations 
of such responses, Any economic analysis of the various components of 
noncompliance must endeavor to take into account not only such 
institutional constraints on the level of punishment or audits, but 
also differences in opportunities to un�erstate taxes,14
Second, the tax context produces a rather unique behavioral 
framework which arguably requires different theoretical approaches. 
Unlike other crimes -- even economic crimes -- tax compliance requires 
a report -- a tax return -- through which the taxpayer directly conveys 
a significant amount of information to the cognizant law enforcement 
agency. The IRS has broad authority to demand information on the tax 
return, to require that such information be supplied under penalties of 
perjury and to adjust its detection and audit programs in light of the 
reports it receives, Yet, as we mentioned above, the existing 
theoretical literature largely ignores this central feature of the 
system, and takes the IRS to be an exogenous element of the revenue 
collection process, despite the fact that the evidence in favor of a 
rational, optimizing IRS seems even more compelling than the evidence 
which supports that view with respect to taxpayers. After all, the 
primary purpose of TCMP audits is to evaluate how taxpayer's reports 
differ from -- and at the same time provide important clues to -- their 
proper income tax liability and then to suggest how IRS audit resources 
might be directed toward their most effective uses. Thus the revenue 
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collection process is best thought of as a 11game11 with observed levels 
of noncompliance, auditing and penalty assessment determined by the 
interaction between taxpayers and the IRS, This approach has important 
implications for both theory and empirical work, a point we shall 
return to in Section 4,15
Finally, the tax compliance problem is different from other 
"crimes" because of the important and confounding roles played by a 
variety of third parties, These include attorneys and accountants who 
advise citizens on tax matters and often insulate them from criminal 
penalties; bankers, brokers and others who accumulate considerable 
information about their customers' financial affairs, appraisers who 
are often paid by taxpayers to estimate values that have important tax 
consequences, and tax shelter promoters and tax protesters who inspire 
citizens to be aggressive in reducing taxes and of ten to engage in 
fraudulent tax reduction activities. The intervention of these third 
parties in the tax compliance context may well require additional 
innovations in theory to capture the tax compliance problem. 
Despite these remarks about the weaknesses of the existing 
theoretical economics literature on tax compliance, we do not mean to 
suggest that economics has nothing to tell us about taxpayer behavior; 
indeed, we believe the compliance problem is largely an economic one. 
Some of the people with substantial opportunities to evade are likely 
to be exactly the sophisticated, rational actors economic models 
postulate, People without substantial opportunities to evade are not 
part of the problem; whether they are responding rationally to a high 
likelihood of detection or are simply "honest" may even be beside the 
point.16
IV. MYTH #3, FISCAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: THE TAX COMPLIANCE 
PROBLEM WOULD D ISAPPEAR IF, FOR EXAMPLE, TAX RATES WERE LOWERED 
OR THE INCOME TAX WERE REPLACED BY A CONSUMPTION TAX 
Consider the following recent quotes: 
One widely accepted explanation for the size and groyfh of 
unreported income is high marginal income tax rates. 
The principal reason [for the growing compliance gap] is that 
inflation is pushing people into highf� and higher tax brackets 
and increasing the pressure to cheat. 
Reducing the benefits [of tax evasion] means finding ways to 
reduce the marginal tax rate.19 
Claims such as these, made by acknowledged tax experts, are 
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commonplace; the myth that high marginal tax rates cause noncompliance 
is the most pervasive of all.20 In fact, that lowering tax rates will
induce greater compliance is a claim supported neither by the theory of 
tax compliance nor by the empirical evidence. This notion stems, at 
least in part, from the basic cost-benefit calculation that 
underreporting produces lesser benefits at lower rates of tax. Where 
fraud penalties are not applicable, however, lower tax rates will also 
reduce the costs of underreporting, and thus the appropriate cost­
benef it calculation tends to yield ambiguous predictions,21 Moreover, 
when the basic economic model is revised to include the actions of 
government auditing and collection agents as a factor in the tax 
compliance calculus, lowering rates suggests greater, rather than 
lesser, noncompliance.22 Unfortunately direct empirical evidence 
regarding the relationship between marginal tax rates and tax evasion 
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is very limited. The most direct study of this issue is due to Charles 
Clotfelter, who examined data from the 1969 TCMP audits. While he 
found a positive relationship existed, this result must be used with 
caution since there are several problems with his study.23
Despite the paucity of formal empirical analysis of this issue, 
the large share of underreporting attributable to capital gain income 
provides a counterexample to the notion that lower rates alone will 
cure noncompliance. Only 40 percent of capital gain income is 
currently taxed, and a top rate of 20 percent applies to capital gains 
(in contrast to the maximum SO percent rate that applies to ordinary 
income) , Nevertheless, transactions involving capital gains currently 
account for a significant proportion of unreported income from legal 
sources -- about 11 percent according to an IRS estimate. This 
suggests that where there is opportunity for underreporting of income 
people will understate such income even if the unreported income would 
be taxed at a low rate, 24 Thus, there is, at this time, little reason 
to believe that lower rates alone are likely to inhibit noncompliance.25 
Compliance, however, might improve through broadening the tax 
base because by repealing tax preference provisions legal uncertainties 
might be lessened; people who itemize deductions might be shifted to 
the standard deduction, which affords much less opportunity for tax 
understatements; and the elimination or reduction of tax shelter 
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investment opportunities might free up IRS compliance personnel for 
other activities, 
Likewise, the emerging mythology that noncompliance would be 
solved by replacing the income tax with a personal tax on consumption 
is not supported by examination of the sources of noncompliance. With 
respect to illegal sources of income, personal expenditure taxes are 
not likely to prove any easier to collect than personal income taxes, 
With regard to legal income sources, most underreporting has 
historically involved sources of income, such as tips, subject neither 
to withholding nor to effective information reporting. It seems 
therefore that the underreporting of receipts from labor and capital 
would be as great a problem under a personal consumption tax as it is 
under the income tax. Enforcement will tend to depend upon the 
efficacy of withholding, third-party reporting and information­
gathering mechanisms, and the ability of the IRS to match third-party 
information with individual returns. A closer look at two important 
sources of unreported income, tips and capital gains, should make this 
clear. Consider the following March 1984 National Public Radio report 
on an anonymous New York waitress: 
"You know, I have nothing against the government, they need 
the money too, " 
Tha, is a waitress, she works here in New York City, at a not 
very �ice restaur�nt, She told me that she does not report any of 
her tips at tax time, The Treasury Department meanwhile in 
Washington, has estimated that up to 84 percent of tip i�come has
gone unreported. , , , 
I asked my waitress what was her salary. How much did she 
make? 
"I get a buck fifty-five an hour. 11 
Reporter: A buck fifty-five an hour, on the understanding 
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that's not really what you are getting? 
Waitress: "Oh no, you think I'd work for $1. 55 an hour?" 
Reporter: You don't look like the kind of person who'd work 
for $1.55 an hour. (ha, ha.) What do you do with the cash when 
they give it to you? • , • 
My waitress [said] that she puts her unreported income in the 
bank every Monday: 
"Oh yeah, I put it in the bank, what else am I going to do 
With it? II 
Reporter: Well do you have any fear that little you, a 
waitress somewhere in the city of New York, would be noticed by 
the Internal Revenue Service and caught? 
Waitress: "I bank the money, I don't spend it very much, " 
Reporter: But there it is. It's on file, Your deposit 
slips are there; they know that you've earned it, which they 
wouldn't know if you didn't put it in the bank. 
Waitress: "That's true, I don't know." 
My waitress is not unusual. Congress found that restaurant 
workers believe the possibility of an audit is so remote that they 
have become fearless, 
Consider a waitress who, under the income tax, deprives the 
federal f isc of the revenue from the unreported tips at her marginal 
tax rate, Under a consumption tax, she might not only conceal the 
receipts but also claim a savings deduction for her deposits in her 
bank account. The consumption tax would thus provide a double benefit 
for underreporting by enabling individuals to consume a credible 
portion of their unreported receipts while deducting their savings from 
their reported receipts. This additional reward for noncompliance 
seems likely to increase incentives for nonreporting not only of tips 
but also of other common forms of unreported receipts (such as income 
from self-employment, moonlighting, dividends, interest, small 
businesses, and so forth) . To the extent that a consumption tax 
requires borrowed amounts to be included in receipts, similar problems 
seem likely to emerge. One possible response of consumption tax 
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proponents is that the deduction for savings will tend to stimulate 
reportable investments (opening savings accounts, for example, instead 
of hiding receipts in mattresses) and thereby facilitate IRS detection 
of underreporting. It nonetheless seems unlikely that our waitress, 
who has not been deterred under the income tax from depositing her 
unreported income in a savings account, would feel constrained from 
deducting these deposits on her consumption tax return. 
By the same token, a consumption tax would markedly increase 
the incentives for not reporting proceeds from the sale of capital 
assets, because all such proceeds could be included in receipts without 
either the exclusion for the taxpayer's "basis" or the 60 percent 
exclusion for the amount by which receipts exceed basis. The 
underreporting of receipts from the sale of property would therefore 
produce a greater loss of tax revenue under a consumption tax than 
under the present income tax, even ignoring the ability of taxpayers 
under a consumption tax to deduct as savings any reinvestment of their 
unreported receipts, This form of noncompliance would make the 
government a two-time loser under a consumption tax: the government 
not only would initially subsidize the purchase of the property by 
allowing its immediate deduction but would, upon sale of the property, 
fail either to recapture its initial investment or to collect tax on 
the investors' gain. 
Finally, it is worth commenting briefly on the consumption tax 
problems of withholding. We do not regard it as accidental that the 
highest estimated rates of compliance under the income tax, currently 
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about 99 percent, involve wages from which taxes can effectively be 
withheld. In effect, income tax withholding makes involuntary the 
income tax reporting and collection process, Accurate withholding 
would almost certainly prove more difficult under an expenditure tax 
than under the current income tax. Withholding is currently estimated 
based on the taxpayer's wages adjusted for the average credits and 
deductions for that wage level. By contrast, under an expenditure tax, 
liability would turn not only on the taxpayer's wages but also on his 
or her expected allocation of income between consumption and savings. 
While wage withholding could probably be made as accurate in the 
aggregate under an expenditure tax as under the income tax, greater 
variations and withholding errors among individuals seem inevitable 
because of variations in savings for different individuals and for the 
same individual in different years, The greatest variations seem 
likely to be concentrated in the upper brackets, where Henry's data 
suggest that problems of income tax noncompliance are greatest. 
Moreover, as one of us has detailed elsewhere, increased information 
reporting, such as reporting of loans, would most likely be necessary 
under an expenditure tax.26
V, CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is certainly true that compliance is a serious 
problem under the current income tax. This problem demands attention, 
both at the level of theory and of fact, in order to achieve a better 
understanding of the problem and perhaps of the economics of crime and 
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mechanisms of deterrence generally. Hopefully, theoretical refinements 
and empirical study will enable us to design better compliance 
mechanisms and to improve those that already exist. The myopic notion 
that compliance problems would disappear, however, if we would lower 
tax rates or shift from an income to a consumption tax does not 
withstand even this introductory analysis. Improving tax compliance 
will almost certainly require further legislative or administrative 
actions specifically directed toward that end. 
20 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Internal Revenue Service, Office of the Assistant Commissioner of
Planning and Research Division, Income Tax Compliance Research
Estimates for 1973-81, July 1983 and James S. Henry, 
"Noncompliance With U.S. Tax Law: Evidence on Size, Growth, and 
Composition, " in P. Sawichi (ed.) Income Tax Compliance: !;, Report 
of the ABA Section on Taxation Invitational Conference on Income
Tax Compliance (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1983) , p. 17.
(Hereafter referred to as Sawichi, 1983, ) 
2. Compliance Gap: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
the Committee on Finance, 97th Congress, 2d Session, 1982.
3. Thomas G. Vitez, "Information Reporting and Withholding as
Stimulants of Voluntary Compliance, 11 in Sawichi (1983) : 191.
4. Henry (1983) . 
5. Charles Clotfelter, "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of
Individual Returns, " Rev. of Econ. and Stat. 65 (1983): 363-373.
6. Another example of the use of TCMP data to analyze individual tax
compliance behavior is provided by Ann Witte and Diane Woodbury,
"The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance:
21 
The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, " National Tax Journal 
(March 1985) . These authors include audit rates and sanction 
levels as explanatory variables in their model but also fail to 
deal with the simultaneity problem. They, in fact, find that for 
some taxpayer classes the probability of a civil fraud penalty is 
negatively related to voluntary compliance. This may be explained 
by simultaneity bias, but may also be explained by the failure of 
audit rates to accurately proxy the likelihood of detection (see 
footnote 14) . 
7. Gary S, Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 11 
Journal of Political Economy 76 (March-April 1968) :169-217. 
8. See, for example, Michael G. Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, "Income 
Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, " Journal of Public 
Economics, 1 (November 1972) : 323-38. A useful summary of the 
literature can be found in Ann Witte and Diane Woodbury, 'What we 
Know About Factors Affecting Compliance with the Tax Laws, " in 
Sawichi (1983) . 
9. As a technical matter this is reflected in the treatment of IRS 
policy instruments as exogenous parameters. 
10. Alvin K. Klevorick, "Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of 
Torts and Crimes" forthcoming in Columbia Law Review. 
11. Internal Revenue Service (1983) . 
12. Tax Compliance Act of 1982 and Related Legislation, Hearings 
before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97 Cong. 2 sess, 
(GPO, 1 9 82) , 
22 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F,2d 1423 (9th Cir. 
1983) (reversing convictions of tax shelter promoters on grounds 
that willfulness was not present because at the time the shelter 
was sold, no statute or court decision directly disallowed the tax 
benefits promised by the transaction the defendents were 
promoting) . 
14. It is often an implicit assumption in discussions of tax evasion 
or avoidance that observed audit frequencies are a natural proxy 
for the probability of detection. However, the recent increase in 
the ability of the IRS to match third party reports to taxpayer 
returns and to process written notices requiring more tax without 
an audit significantly weakens this link. For example, taxpayer 
classes for which the majority of income is in the form of wages 
have very low audit frequencies. But the likelihood that a 
substantial understatement of income will be detected is 
23 
nevertheless very high for members of this class, The lack of 
opportunity for tax evasion here translates as a high probability 
of detection and thus explains the high compliance levels for 
these classes of taxpayers straightforwardly in terms of the 
standard economic model, The real compliance problem, however, 
rests with those classes of taxpayers who do have an opportunity 
for tax evasion and it is in understanding their behavior that 
more sophisticated models are needed, 
15. For models which begin to incorporate the strategic elements of 
the tax compliance game see Michael J, Graetz, Jennifer F. 
Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, "An Equilibrium Model of Tax 
Compliance With A Bayesian Auditor and Some 'Honest' Taxpayers," 
Caltech Social Science Working Paper no. 506, December 1983 and 
Michael J, Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde, "A 
Simple Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Audits, 11 
Caltech Social Science Working Paper no. 520, November 1984.
16, One common criticism of economic models of tax evasion is that 
taxpayers are in fact ignorant of the relevant probabilities of 
detection facing them. This conclusion is based largely on survey 
data which often fails to distinguish taxpayers by class, 
particularly with respect to opportunities to evade. If one asks 
an average taxpayer, for whom these opportunities are limited, to 
estimate the likelihood of audit, the answer will be meaningless 
24 
since audits are not particularly relevant to such a taxpayer, 
If, instead, one asks the same taxpayer for an estimate that a 
given understatement of income will be detected by the IRS, the 
taxpayer's detection probability estimate (11DPE11) is likely to be 
high and reasonably accurate. Pooling these taxpayers with those 
who do have opportunities to evade will clearly bias average 
estimates of audit probabilities upward, but it is the probability 
of detection which is important. See footnote 14 for a related 
discussion. See also Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1983) for a 
model which incorporates the presence of some "honest" taxpayers, 
17, Clotfelter (1983) , p. 363. 
18, Thomas Vitez, quoted in Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1984. 
19. Alfred Blunstein, "Models for Structuring Taxpayer Compliance," in
Sawichi (1983) : 170,
20, The most recent example of which we are aware can be found in 
Henry Aaron and Harvey Galper, Assessing Tax Reform (Brookings 
Institute, Washington, D.C. , 1985) , These authors list only two 
items as factors affecting compliance, marginal tax rates and 
complexity, stating that ''the increase in the typical marginal tax 
rate has made tax avoidance increasingly profitable," (page 42) . 
25 
21. For a summary of the literature and relevant results see Witte and 
Woodbury (1983) . It is worth noting, however, that when the 
penalty is based on the amount of taxes evaded, then even the 
standard "economics of crime" model predicts that higher tax rates 
yield increased compliance; see Shlono Yitzhaki, "A Note on Income 
Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis," .:L.. Pub. Econ. 3 (1974) : 201-
202. A more recent survey is provided by Frank Cowell, "The 
Economics of Tax Evasion: A Survey," London School of Economics, 
February 1985. 
22. See Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1983) . The point is that when 
marginal tax rates increase, the incentive to audit also 
increases. Thus, even if the partial equilibrium effect is to 
increase noncompliance, the general equilibrium effect, which 
incorporates the IRS response, is a decrease in noncompliance. 
23, Clotfelter (1983), Clotfelter's study is based on TCMP audit 
data, and thus suffers from the limitations of that source 
discussed in Section II of this paper. In particular, his measure 
of the extent of noncompliance is the difference between the level 
of true income as determined by the TCMP audit and actual reported 
income. But the TCMP program is known to miss substantial amounts 
of unreported income. Moreover, initial TCMP assessments can be 
appealed, and when they are evidence suggests they tend to be 
reduced (Henry, 1983) , In other words, there is a process by 
which the TCMP auditors decide how much to assess, and that 
process must take account of the likelihood of appeal and the 
outcome of the appeal if one is made. If the result of this 
process is higher initial assessments for taxpayers with higher 
marginal tax rates, then it will appear in the dats that higher 
marginal tax rates imply greater noncompliance. Besides calling 
26 
Clotfelter's results into doubt, this provides yet another example 
of the need for theory to take into account the unique structural 
and behavioral features of the tax compliance problem. 
24. The stringent reporting requirements of the 1982 legislation do 
not seem likely to solve the capital gain underreporting problem 
because noncompliance here tends not to involve securities or 
commodities but instead real estate, section 1231 exchanges, and 
collectibles such as coins, antiques, precious metals and works of art. 
25. The issue of the relationship between marginal tax rates and 
taxpayer compliance is truly complex. For example, even if one 
found a positive correlation in a properly specified model, the 
direction of causation is not obvious. In India, where marginal 
tax rates are as high as 90 percent, tax evasion is massive. 
Indian commentators, however, suggest that there is a "climate for 
evasion " in that country (i.e., lax enforcement) which allows 
nominally high marginal tax rates. The latter are felt to be 
desirable politically, so the di'recti'on f · o causation may run from 
noncompliance to high marginal tax rates, 
26, Michael J, Graetz, "Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax," 
Harvard Law Review 92 (June 1979) :1598-1609 
27 
